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 Total liberation involves every facet of the personality. 
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         Frantz Fanon, 223 
 
 The “total liberation” that Fanon referred to is not just that of an individual: it is 
also that of a society. Fanon, of course, had firsthand experience of both as a psychiatrist 
in 1950s Algeria during the War of Independence: the colonial rule of France had left 
deep marks upon Algerian society and people which, on the one hand, contributed to 
violence within the Algerian population as a whole, and on the other, psychological 
disturbances which became all the more apparent during the war. Seeing the connection 
between political structures and mental health, Fanon concluded that genuine political 
freedom would not occur unless the psychological edifices of colonial power were also 
uprooted.  
 In this vein, using Freud, Deleuze and Guattari, Fanon, and Said, this paper argues 
that not only are mental disorders are produced through an individual’s positionally-
informed relationship with her social environment but also that the mechanisms of 
disorder production involve the pathological repetition of behaviour and psychic 
processes and, at a more fundamental level, stasis in the productive action of the 
unconscious. The Oedipus complex is instrumental in this as it suffuses interrelationships 
and psychological functions with deep power differentials. In discussing this, the paper 
progresses in three sections. The first section lays out the general groundwork for 
understanding the unconscious as theorized by Freud and Deleuze and Guattari and 
establishes that the idea of unconsciousness is itself very unstable especially when 
considered in relation to the conceptual binaries that support it as well as in how it exists 
in relation to social phenomena. The next section subsequently discusses the 
ramifications of such an understanding of the unconscious as mental disorders are 
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concerned, and contrasts the nuances of Freud’s understanding with that of Deleuze and 
Guattari by focusing on the mechanisms that produce mental illness. This is identified as 
being both a temporal, behavioural, and relational stasis as well as being simultaneously 
a phenomenon characterized by repetition. The final section looks more closely at the 
social-political levers that drive or produce these mechanisms, locating them generally in 
the Oedipus complex and its various iterations such as in colonialism. 
 
 The unconscious and its (ontological) discontents  
 
There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process 
that produces the one within the other … the self and the non-self, 
outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever.   
       Deleuze and Guattari, 2 
 
 Given its importance to mental and psychic processes generally, discussing the 
unconscious must be an initial point of departure. However, defining it is itself a complex 
task which is not unproblematic. Freud was among the first to articulate the idea that 
there could be a part or region of the human being that existed outside or separate to 
conscious and aware knowing. In Freud’s work, the unconscious is conceptualized as the 
repository of inaccessible (i.e., rationally un-known and un-recognized) material such as 
repressed memories (Freud 1981, 30) and, particularly, sexual drives (ibid, 46). Sexuality 
links behavior directly to biological functions and embodied experience via the action of 
instincts and drives; however, due to the effects of society, in Freud’s schema, these 
drives become repressed, rendered inaccessible to conscious awareness. 
 Such a clear distinction between the poles of conscious/unconscious, human/nature, 
civilized/uncivilized, and even self/society is unstable, however, even in Freud’s work. 
To discuss this as such, it is necessary to first briefly discuss the meta-ontology that 
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connects these concepts. To approach the matter from a different, but related direction, to 
Deleuze and Guattari, the divisions and distinctions maintained between production, 
consumption, and distribution are supported and maintained by the binaristic 
constructions of man/nature and civilization/nature (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 3). These 
are categories that draw their bases, ontologically speaking, from a deeper fissure: 
bios/zoe. This conceptual map, which is at its essence humanistic and Western, organizes 
phenomena according to divisions such as rational/non-rational, conscious/unconscious, 
active/passive, civilized/feral, human/non-human, and male/female; these poles intersect 
with other constructions such as self/Other (Braidotti 2010, 207) and, after Said, 
European/non-European. It is possible to see these binaries play out in a typical rendering 
of, for example, the production process, where human (typically male, white, Western) 
intelligence and technology acts upon the inert and passive substance of nature in order to 
produce something. Thus extracted from the Other, it is then possible for the product (or 
whatever) to be consumed and, thus internalized and assimilated into the self.  
 Following Freud and traditional psychoanalysis, the conscious/unconscious divide 
roughly follows the same terrain; at the same time, there is a deconstructive tension 
throughout Freud’s work that directly challenges this. Central to Civilization and its 
Discontents— indeed, present in the very title of the work—is the idea that civilized 
society is of a separate order from other domains of life, which, in this case, is human 
instinctual urges: the natural, animalistic, and untamed. However, within Freud’s work on 
this relationship is his deconstructive and quite radical argument against the received 
wisdom of his Victorian time that the uncivilized and unconscious was, categorically, the 
repository of the undesirable and useless. Freud vindicates the instinctual by claiming, 
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through the process of sublimation, that it is directly responsible for the creation of 
culture: “[the sublimation of instinct] is what makes it possible for higher psychical 
activities, scientific, artistic, or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life. 
… it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a 
renunciation of instinct” (Freud 2002, 44). In such a way, that sense of radical alterity 
present in humans—unconscious instinctual drives, the “animalistic”—are rendered as 
active agents in the creation and sustaining of forms normatively associated with the 
human domain. In other words, in Freud’s understanding of the psyche, the unconscious 
retains a certain productive quality, an attribute that directly challenges the bios/zoe 
binary upon which normative understandings of being, non-being and creative activity 
are built. 
 However, as Freud and Deleuze and Guattari show, that these distinctions and their 
meta-category, bios/zoe, are troubled at best makes conceptual room for an unconscious 
that is active and agentic as well as being located both internally and externally. Hence 
their reflection that schizophrenia is “the essential reality of man and nature;” it has no 
boundaries, no distinctions between self/Other, production/consumption (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 5). While Freud’s work does problematize such sure distinctions between 
rational/irrational, civilization/nature, it stops short of giving desire the same treatment; 
Deleuze and Guattari pick this problem up and expand on it in the concept of the 
desiring-machine. In contrast with Freud and Lacan, desire is not the reaction to a sense 
of absence, but is the animating principle of production; it is production. Desire does not 
travel through a void to attain its completion and satisfaction, but, instead, is a productive 
agent in its own right. With the collapse of production/consumption, cause/effect is, also, 
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a temporal collapse evocative of the digital age: the human in the world becomes 
enmeshed in flows of simultaneity and the desiring-machine becomes linked to other 
machines as in a circuit. Again, what is of importance here is the idea that the 
unconscious is deterritorialized: it is not so much a personal quality as it is an interactive, 
intersubjective field. This resembles Bataille’s concept of heterogeneity as well as 
Lacan’s objet a insofar as they resemble fields of human (and, presumably, non-human) 
experience which exist outside of, yet defined in relation to, socio-linguistic structural 
relations of power and meaning. Unconsciousness, in this frame, is pure alterity, the big 
Other, constituting political relationships while also, at the same time, providing 
resistance against them. Put differently, un-consciousness is an important constitutive 
element of zoe, that domain of the non-human and inhuman that, while being 
fundamentally exterior to bios, also constitutes it. 
 
 Political constructions and mental disorders: mechanisms of illness 
 In Deleuze and Guattari’s framework, then, the unconscious continually produces 
and reproduces itself: it is properly understood as being like a factory. Desiring-
production is also necessarily something that exists in co-relation with the environment; 
on a fundamental level, it is not possible to usefully separate one from the other. If the 
site of the unconscious is multiple (or diffuse or nomadic), then it follows that there are 
multiple nodes or domains via which mental disorders can become manifest (so, for 
example, the view that disorder is biochemical in etiology or otherwise biologically 
situated is not antagonistic to the standpoint that it originates through social determinants, 
but is instead a part of the same continuum). On this, Deleuze and Guattari’s work is in 
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accordance with Freud’s. Putting aside temporarily the involvement of political 
influences on producing mental disorders, however, the reification of disorder in each 
body of work presents as being different in emphasis. To Freud, mental illness is a 
product of repetition, although in common with Deleuze and Guattari, Freud also sees 
disorder to arise through what seems to be its opposite: fixity. Upon a closer analysis, it is 
apparent that the two perspectives are, in fact, quite complementary, although the 
ontological bases upon which Freud’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis rest differ on a 
substantial point. 
 
 A. Neurotic illness, fixity, and repetition 
 Freud observed of his neurotic patients that the origin of their disorders was most 
frequently to be found in their (typically social) experiences. In his words, a symptom 
“was usually brought about by the convergence of several traumas, and often by the 
repetition of a great number of similar ones” (ibid. 1981, 14; emphasis added). What is 
interesting about this statement is that it sets up repetition located in the “external” as a 
precondition for disorder in the “internal.” However, as Freud’s work shows, what is 
regarded as the self is deeply shaped by social and biological factors—to the extent that 
such categories as internal and external are rendered problematic and destabilized. While 
it would not be accurate to suggest that remembered but consciously inaccessible social 
experiences are equivalent to the unconscious mind, there is a strong relationship 
between the two, which suggests the potential for mutual influence. As this bears great 
relevance to Deleuze and Guattari’s work, as will be demonstrated later, this idea also 
surfaces in Fanon and Said in their discussions on colonialism. 
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 Repetition is also central to the symptomology of neurosis. Throughout Freud’s 
case studies in “Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” his patients display behavioural “tics” 
such as the woman who developed an inability to drink from a glass of water (1981, 13) 
or the woman who make clacking sounds every time she became excited (1981, 15). 
Freud offers a physical explanation for these behavioural abnormalities: in the case of 
neurosis, the nervous system becomes quite unable to “discharge” excitation physically, 
which produces psychological and behavioural symptoms (1981, 19). The metaphor he 
uses to describe this, which he calls “hysterical conversion,” is of a river current that 
becomes divided; if one of the channels becomes blocked, it will overflow into the other 
(1981, 18).  
 That Freud’s “flow” of excitement can become stopped, thereby causing symptoms, 
presents an interesting tension relative to the role he outlines for repetition. Memory, 
unsurprisingly, plays a critical role, and the tendency towards fixation on particular 
memories and its relation to mental disorder likewise does not go unremarked upon. In 
fixation, a kind of temporal collapse occurs wherein an individual retains an emotional 
attachment to some traumatic past occurrence(s) to such a degree that phenomena in the 
present recede in importance to them; their life, or part of it, remains effectively in the 
past (1981, 17). Thus, in fixation, two apparently contradictory things are happening: the 
individual’s desires stop interacting in a fluctuating, changing way with the environment 
and instead coalesce around the affective content of an event in the past; and this 
overinvestment with a past phenomenon leads to the repetition of desire complexes, and, 
hence, behaviour.  
 That fixity and repetition are so linked in the production of mental disorders is 
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something that is picked up also in Deleuze and Guattari, although the emphases are 
somewhat rather different. To them, reality is organized by way of flows and stoppages 
of flows; they define a machine as “a system of interruptions or breaks” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 36). This system of continuities extends through materiality as well as 
social and psychic reality, though of critical importance here is that machines do not 
break the continuity of the system, but rather “condition” it (ibid. 36). Machines redefine 
the context of flows in which they exist according to their own function, which is another 
way of saying that a machine is an inherently relational entity. In addition to qualifying 
flows, machines, in fact, are also the source of flows—or are one themselves (ibid. 36). 
The salient point here is that life—whether it is social, ecological, economic, or what 
have you—is productive, and it is built upon a series of interrelationships with other 
domains of life that are continually shifting and exchanging. 
 In this schema, a desiring-machine is somewhat of an analogue to the Freudian 
unconscious, though Deleuze and Guattari grant it much more productivity than even 
psychoanalysis does for the reason that the Oedipus complex has such a repressive effect 
on the productive nature of the unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 24) that Freud 
may not have been able to take fully into account the full productive capacities of the 
unconscious. What organisms share, they write, is a common productive ability that 
arises from the action of desiring-machines (ibid. 8); as for desiring-production, this is 
identical to social production (ibid. 30). Where mental disorder arises in this system is 
when the flow that issues from desiring-production becomes rigidified and stopped. 
Rather than conflicting with Freud’s observations on the repetitive nature of neurotic 
illness, however, this view corroborates with it in that behaviour becomes “stuck” in 
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relation to others, though for Deleuze and Guattari, the mechanism for this is explicitly 
found within the homogeneous (to borrow from Bataille) structures of power that 
organize society, which they call the socius and of which the Oedipus complex is a part.  
 
 B. Social power structures and mental disturbances 
 The way that the socius interacts with desiring-production is much like the way in 
which civilization generally acts to repress instinctual drives in psychoanalysis: the main 
action of the socius is “to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to 
see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, regulated” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 33). Depending on the time and place, there have been 
different ways in which the socius has accomplished this based on the political form that 
it has taken, and, most critically, depending on the form of the socius, different mental 
disorders have become most prevalent. For example, Deleuze and Guattari argue that due 
to the kinds of desire regulation and codification prevalent under the “territorial machine,” 
hysteria was most prevalent; likewise, the “despotic machine” tended to produce manic 
depression and paranoia (ibid. 33). Capitalism, however, is a structure of power 
relations—a “social machine”—of a very different sort in that its main action is to 
“decode” and “deterritorialize” the flows of desiring-production—thus rendering 
schizophrenia as the dominant psychic product of the current age (ibid. 34). In another 
paradox, though, the repressive ancillary structures that make the capitalist project 
possible—its bureaucracies, legal apparatuses, police forces, and so forth—both 
simultaneously inhibit and promote complete deterritorialization, and the complementary 
reterritorialization that occurs takes the form of the Oedipus complex, “the ultimate 
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territoriality” (ibid. 35).  
 All of this is to say: like Freud, Deleuze and Guattari see the critical importance of 
the social in the production of mental disorders. As with Freud, there occurs a 
behavioural alteration or, perhaps more accurately, adaptation, that is in response to 
social arrangements (although Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual model suggests a high 
degree of co-interaction and co-creation between individual and environment). However: 
the emphasis here is much more on the interruption and rigidification of “flow” as the 
origin of disorder. In more concrete terms, this refers to not just the repression of desire: 
with desire being productive and instrumental in creating not only relations, but also 
reality itself, if its flows become impeded, the unconscious effectively ceases to be 
productive. Rather: instead of being like a “factory,” it becomes a “theater” that is given 
to merely reenacting mythical, symbolic representations of social reality, and what causes 
this to occur is precisely the involvement of the Oedipus complex (Deleuze and Guattari, 
24). This, of course, is not far off at all from the Freudian model; as mentioned earlier, 
Freud believed that the repression of desire and the subsequent blocking of neuro-
biological excitatory impulses was a chief factor in producing neurosis. However, while 
Freud saw the Oedipus complex as a more or less natural desire that nevertheless had to 
be repressed in whole or in part in order for the individual to function well in society, 
Deleuze and Guattari find it responsible for repression. 
  
 Power and Oedipus 
 Nevertheless, the point that there is a high degree of desire repression in connection 
with the Oedipus complex is one upon which both Freud and Deleuze and Guattari are in 
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accordance. Of central importance to it is social power: Freud’s depiction of the lust the 
infant has for its parents and its desire to kill the parent of the same sex is really on a 
fundamental level a narrative about a desire to ascend in social hierarchy and therefore 
power and importance. Freud’s work takes this conflict as central and even natural to a 
human’s psychological development; that there should be a universal human drive to 
hierarchically arrange social relations in such a violent way is assumed. Where repression 
comes into play is that the strength and nature of the desire is considered offensive to the 
internalized set of social mores as embodied in the superego, which, in Freud’s schema, 
acts to keep the content unconscious by way of guilt and shame feelings. This action is 
what Freud claims to constitute the “’nuclear complex’ of every neurosis” (ibid. 1981, 
47). 
 As writers such as Fanon and Said have observed, to the extent that colonial power 
exists suggests that there also exists a social framework based on hierarchy and 
subjugation in Western(ized) societies. This is the essence of the Oedipus complex, but 
where Deleuze and Guattari depart from Freud is informed by their ontology and they 
accordingly see it as a non-essential—albeit important—component of society. Returning 
to their statements that humans are not meaningfully distinguishable from nature and that 
reality—physical, biological, social—is actively produced by way of flows of 
interrelations between machines, the ontological underpinning in their vision is one that 
is definitively non-hierarchical.  What the statement “Oedipus presupposes a fantastic 
repression of desiring-machines” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 3) means here is that 
political power and hierarchy as particularly embodied in the patriarchal, 
heteronormative, and Eurocentric Oedipus complex is what is central to stultifying the 
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productive qualities of the unconscious/life itself—“the only real relationship” (ibid. 
24)—that is otherwise embodied in humans. To Deleuze and Guattari, the Oedipus 
complex itself is the source of repression because of how it codes experience. 
Representation—rendering the productive “factory” of the unconscious as a “theater”—is, 
at its essence, a linguistic act. 
 This theatre of representations, built as it is upon language, becomes the territory 
upon which the narratives of power are inscribed and reified; as seen in the work of 
Fanon and Said, these narratives take the shape of relationships with the Other that are 
subjugating. To be clear, however, mental disorders are not produced in a unidirectional 
fashion by way of “external” social phenomena impacting the “internal” world of the 
individual; as Deleuze and Guattari and Said suggest, this inner/outer binary is 
problematized by the way that identity and, by extension, the concept of the self, is 
transcorporeally constituted from multiple overlapping and sometimes conflicting 
categorizations (Said 2003, 44). In practice, however—and this is a crucial point—the 
Oedipus complex nevertheless renders this complexity as a binary; as was discussed 
earlier, this takes the shape of bios/zoe, with the Oedipus complex residing in the bios 
pole. An unfortunate result of this is that the nonhierarchical and relational position 
humans would otherwise have to nature in the absence of the Oedipus complex becomes 
violently compressed in the zoe pole with the addition of Oedipalizing. 
 With this in mind, it is possible to see how flows of desiring-production, when 
rigidified as in via the Oedipus complex and subject to repetitive iterations, contribute to 
mental disorders and social oppression. The work of Frantz Fanon with psychiatric 
patients during the Algerian war of independence provides a good case study. What is 
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brilliant about his work was that he acknowledged how the Oedipal violence of 
colonialism, when internalized, produces mental disturbances. When taken to its extreme, 
as in colonialism, the Oedipus complex produces a kind of domination so complete that it 
obliterates the humanity of the colonized, rendering the native people as merely a feature 
of the landscape: the violent compression into zoe. He writes: “a colonized people is not 
just a dominated people. Under the German occupation the French remained human 
beings…In Algeria there is not simply domination but the decision, literally, to occupy 
nothing else but a territory” (Fanon 2004, 182). Colonized people do not get to exist 
within the bios pole of life, but are quite completely submerged within zoe: “a hostile, 
ungovernable, and fundamentally rebellious Nature is in fact synonymous in the colonies 
with the bush, the mosquitoes, the natives, and disease” (ibid. 182).    
 As Fanon’s work shows, the social violence that that produces and enforces the 
categories of colonizer and colonized, human and nature, is continuous with 
psychological and affective dislocations and ruptures: this continuity means that 
structural violence becomes reproduced, over and over, in not just structural, but also in 
interpersonal and internal, personal ways. Evocative of Freud’s research, not only were 
“psychosomatic” issues such as gastric ulcers and dysmenorrhea (Fanon 2004, 216) 
present along with psychological disturbances such as depression and panic attacks (ibid. 
196), but also interpersonal violence among the colonized Algerians. This latter fact did 
not escape the attention of prominent Western scientists of the time, and Fanon relates 
some of the theories such people had to explain this: Dr. J. C. Carothers of the World 
Health Organization, for example, wrote that “the impulsiveness of the Algerian, the 
frequency and nature of his murders [and] his permanent criminal tendencies” were the 
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result of “primitivism” in the form of a reduced brain function “like the inferior 
vertebrates” (Fanon 2004, 226). This statement on the one hand lays quite bare the kind 
of institutionalized racism that was—and is—supported by overtures to a supposedly 
empirical impartiality, and on the other hand, displays the exact sort of dehumanizing 
violence that is so characteristic of a colonial mentality.  
 
 Concluding thoughts 
 As is apparent in the previous discussion, colonialism is, fundamentally, a 
systematized form of violence that is mediated psychologically by the Oedipus complex, 
insofar as the Oedipus complex is an internalized, mythic, and linguistically-formed 
representation of hierarchy and power. Such violence, for colonized people like Algerians 
as well as every other group of people that have a relative lack of social power, is 
experienced repetitively in day to day life; for his part, Fanon was particularly witness to 
the physical, tangible result of this: colonial warfare. In accordance with Freud’s 
observations on the genesis of mental disorders, Fanon also saw that the repetition of 
stimuli in the social environment typically leads to psychological disturbance (Fanon 
2004, 184; see also 194, 197). 
 Following Deleuze and Guattari, the Oedipus complex is also at the same time a 
repressive and rigidifying structure that at once organizes social relations around 
differentials of power and alters the function of the human unconscious where it becomes 
unable to interact with other beings and phenomena in an unstructured, non-hierarchical, 
and (linguistically) unmediated way. The idea that a “flow” is impeded in the production 
of mental disorders is present in both Freud’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work, and this 
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paper’s objective has been to track how both this stasis and repetition are essentially two 
sides of the same coin where the development and sustainment of mental disorders are 
concerned. 
 If the political is so tightly connected to, or indistinguishable from, the 
psychological, then it follows that political change must involve psychological change… 
or psychological resistance. Fanon’s work clearly demonstrated the importance of the 
latter; in effect, native Algerians were engaged in resisting their own Oedipalization, 
though ultimately, this required that they take up arms against their would-be 
Oedipalizers. The fight must be both external and internal, and for good reason: although 
the Oedipus complex and the bios/zoe dichotomy that it supports structure experiences 
along lines of internal/external and self/Other, as Deleuze and Guattari’s work also 
demonstrates, these distinctions are little more than fabrications that support very 
political objectives. It is in the interest of all to interrogate this deeply throughout every 
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